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This paper examines unconditional long-run expected returns for US equity and bond markets and 
contrast returns with those of four large economies. We confirm earlier studies on the US and find 
that, as a result of repricing, actual equity returns have exceeded what could reasonably be 
expected. As bonds returned less, the excess return was spectacular. With the exception of the UK, 
investors in other countries were less fortunate. Our results lend credibility to the argument that 
analysis using US historical data is overly comforting. Survivorship bias seems clearly an issue. 
Based on current valuations, expected returns on US equities are low and actual returns might well 
disappoint. 
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It is a well-documented stylised fact that investing in equity has provided investors with a 
return far above the risk free rate of return. In order to compensate for the embedded 
risks, investing in equities should provide investors with a premium: the equity risk 
premium (ERP). However, the excess return has been greater than what could be 
expected based on classical equilibrium theory. In a classic paper, Mehra and Prescott 
[1985] showed that for the US in the period 1889 – 1978 the difference has been in 
excess of 6% per year. Being incapable of associating the measured risk with the 
observed return, Mehra and Prescott dubbed the phenomenon the equity premium puzzle. 
Ever since, the issue caught the attention of academics as well as practitioners and 
spawned a whole new literature based on two classes of explanations for the existence of 
the ERP puzzle: theoretical and empirical. This paper is a contribution to the empirical 
side of research. 1      
Within this empirical side of research we are often confused as the term equity 
risk premium is used in both the ex post and ex ante approach, while Mehra [2003] 
clearly states that the two are different. One is the historical excess return of equity 
relative to bonds, and the other is the prospective risk premium for equities relative to 
bonds. Hence we adopt different labels and use excess return for the ex post estimates and 
equity risk premium for the ex ante measure. Within the area of ex post estimates of 
excess return Siegel [1992] extended the Mehra-Prescott sample. He found an average 
annualised excess return of 5.3% over the period 1802-1990. With most of the low excess 
return, interestingly enough, at the start of this time frame and the large excess return at 
the end. Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995] and Goetzmann and Jorion [1999] suggest 
the high returns in US equities to be an exception. Both studies hint at the issue of 
survivorship bias. By only using US data, one surely picks the economic winner of the 
                                                 
1 For an excellent discussion of the theoretical literature we refer to Kocherlakota [1996] and 
Mehra and Prescott [2002]. 
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last century. Blanchard [1993], Fase [1997] and Dimson, Marsh and Staunton [2001] 
show the robustness of the puzzle by studying a number of developed countries. This, 
however, still does not completely resolve the issue of survivorship bias as emerging 
markets are not included. 
The above mentioned ex ante approach is the main focus of our study. It is of 
importance to know what people could reasonable have expected from equity. Cochrane 
[2001] questions whether people just after the Second World War, and throughout the 
period, knew that equity was going to return 5% over bonds, but shied away because they 
were afraid of the 14% volatility? Many attempts have been made to estimate the ERP 
using forward-looking information. Claus and Thomas [2001] and Gebhart, Lee and 
Swaminathan [2001] rely on valuation models to estimate expected returns and use 
forecasts by analysts to estimate future growth. Claus and Thomas [2001] find equity 
premia as low as 3%, but as analysts’ expectations are only available over recent decades, 
their sample period is short (1985 – 1998). Arnott and Bernstein [2002] have a 
substantially longer sample period, 1802 – 2001. They use historical dividend growth and 
state that the current long-term ERP may well be near zero, perhaps even negative. Fama 
and French [2002] estimate the unconditional equity premium using dividend and 
earnings growth and note that the actual excess return was much more than investors 
could reasonably have expected. Our research interest in this paper is twofold. First, we 
use the Fama and French [2002] methodology to study unconditional long run expected 
returns for US equity markets. Second, as we find that this field of empirical finance has 
mostly focuses on US markets, we aim to extend the analysis to include France, 
Germany, Japan and the UK. Using the same methodology, we contrast the US data with 
expectations for other major markets. 2 
                                                 
2 Two points are worth a brief comment. First, it can be argued that the Gordon is a poor model to 
estimate expected equity returns. Alternative models are presented in Ilmanen [2003]. In all of the 
approaches assumptions are needed, which either might not make empirical sense, lack theoretical 
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Our data confirm previous results as we also find that excess returns in the US 
have surpassed what could reasonably be expected. However, in line with the 
survivorship bias arguments discussed above, it can be argued that it would be overly 
comforting just to study the US data. In comparison to the return distribution for other 
countries, the US data are very well behaved. It does not suffer from capital market 
closures, large (negative) outliers or substantial post-war inflation. The UK is the only 
other market where excess returns have been ahead of expectations. Even taking only the 
recent forty years as a base case for comparison, excess returns in other markets 
disappoint.    
In the next section we present the methodology used to estimate expected equity 
and bond returns. The third section describes the data, with extra attention paid to the US 
data. We follow with our empirical results. A brief discussion of current outlook for 
equity and bond returns is in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
Fama and French [2002] base their unconditional expected return for equity on the 
Gordon [1962] growth model. The Gordon estimate of the expected equity return is the 
average dividend yield during the estimation period, plus the average growth rate of 
dividends, 







æ=    ( 2.1 ) 
                                                                                                                                     
underpinnings or suffer from data availability. Arguably the best alternative is to adopt earnings 
yield as the best predictor of future equity returns. Unfortunately, such data is not available for a 
larger set of countries. Second, we estimate ERPs based on local markets as we argue it is 
justifiable that for a large part of our sample period global stock markets were not fully integrated 
(see Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst [2001]). We note the anology to the current debate 
surrounding emerging markets (Bekaert and Harvey [2002]).  
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Given stationarity assumptions for all relevant stochastic processes (dividend yield, 
dividend growth rate and capital gains) and a long estimation period, the model produces 
unbiased estimates of the long-term expected equity return. Stationarity implies that if the 
sample period is long, the compound rate of dividend growth approaches the compound 
rate of capital gain. The logic underlying (2.1) applies to any variable that is cointegrated 
with equity prices. It must be stressed that the model abstracts from changes in yield; 
current yields are assumed to be fair. 
As with equity, Ilmanen [1995] shows that current bond yields is a fair estimate 
of future bond returns. With the introduction of TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected 
Securities) in January 1997, we have a US government bond that pays a real return. 3  
However, for longer sample periods only nominal bond yields are readily observable. 
Under the assumption that current yields are a fair estimate of future bond yield, we can 
calculate the unconditional long run expected real return on bonds by the average bond 
yield during the estimation period, minus the average actual annual rate of inflation (2.2). 
     ( ) ( ) ( )INFLABYArE b -=     ( 2.2 ) 
Now that we have an expected equity return based on a simple dividend growth 
model and an expected bond yield based on the current yield and inflation, we construct 
the ERP as the difference between the two (2.3). Upon construction we have a series that 
describes what investors could reasonably have expected for the excess return of equities 
over bonds.  
     ( ) ( )be rErEERP -=     ( 2.3 ) 
In the following sections, we will use equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) for 
estimation. Before doing so we will give a description of the data.  
 
                                                 
3 The acronym TIPS is still in use although the securities have been renamed Treasury Inflation-
Indexed Securities. 
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3. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Our sample periods are long; at least 75 years of monthly data are used in our study. The 
US data are all from Shiller [2000], who documents data from 1871, when the S&P 500 
came into existence. Data on other markets are from Global Financial Data. Not all data 
series have similar sample periods; Table 1 gives the breakdown by variable. Also note 
that some data series have omissions because several capital markets were closed during 
the World Wars.  
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Table 1: International data series. This table gives the sample periods for which we have data available. The final row 
are the full sample dates.  
 France Germany Japan UK US 
Inflation 1901 1871 1900 1906 1871 
Bond  1901 1924 1871 1871 1871 
Equity 1901 1871 1914 1871 1871 
Dividend 1901 1871 1926 1924 1871 
Full sample 1901 1924 1926 1924 1871 
 
The dramatic investment implications of the differential rates of return can be 
seen in Table 2, which compares the return on equity and bonds for the US. The table 
highlights three key observations: 
1. It shows the wealth building potential of equity over bonds, the accumulation of 
an excess return of 4.79% a year. This number is slightly less than reported in the 
literature. Differences are due to differences in sample periods and use of bonds 
instead of risk-free rates with shorter maturities. 
2. It shows the power of dividends. The difference between price and total return 
amounts to 4.89%. Accumulating income comprises over half the real total return 
on equity. These data put the lie to the conventional view that equities derive 
most of their return from capital appreciation, that income is far less relevant, if 
not irrelevant (see Arnott and Bernstein [2002]).  
3. It shows the price of inflation. The real terminal wealth is notably less than the 
nominal terminal wealth. Inflation approximately erodes 2.1% purchasing power 
per annum in the full sample period. 
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Table 2: Terminal value of $1 invested. This table gives the terminal wealth from investment in equity and bonds for the 
sample period 1871 – 2000. The first rows display the real and nominal returns based on total return, which is including 
reinvested dividends. The final rows give the price return, excluding the dividends.  
Investment Period Equities  Bonds  
 Total Return    
 Real Nominal Real Nominal 
Jan 1871 – Dec 2000 9289.67 115471.78 24.43 341.03 
Annual return 7.28% 9.38% 2.49% 4.59% 
 Price Return    
 Real Nominal   
Jan 1871 – Dec 2000 21.47 299.76   
Annual return 2.39% 4.49%   
 
The graphs in the appendix provide a graphical overview of the nominal and real 
total return indices for all equity and bond markets. It is clear that returns in other markets 
are far less exuberant and much more volatile. We can witness catastrophic losses in 
nominal terms and the detrimental effects on inflation. Post war inflation is clearly 
evident in some countries. Still, the period of Weimar inflation, which is not in our full 
sample period for Germany, is by far the most extreme. In the Appendix we also display 
real returns, volatilities and standard errors by decade. As the aim of investing is to 
provide for consumption in later stages of life, the remainder of this paper focuses on real 
total returns.  
Sample statistics for the four variables needed to estimate the expected return on 
equity and bonds (dividend yields, dividend growth rates, nominal bond yields and 
inflation) are also in the Appendix. In addition we provide a graphical display of dividend 
yields. These data convey some interesting points. First, the monthly consumer price 
inflation and dividend growth data contain several outliers. Second, dividend yields at the 
end of the sample period are below their long-run averages for all countries. This 
corresponds with the well-known fact that equity markets have become more expensive 
as investors were willing to pay a higher price for a stream of dividends. Third, though 
beyond the scope on this paper, we would highlight that dividends in the US have not 
kept pace with economic growth and almost consistently fallen short of economic gains. 
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Ritter [2003] documents that this is also the case for other markets and provides several 
explanations. We do not report statistics, but note that (2.1) produces unbiased estimates 
of the long-term expected equity return. We can confirm that dividend yields, dividend 
growth rates and capital gains are stationary. Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics point 
towards no unit root. First order autocorrelations of dividend yields are high, but decay 
across longer lags. This is in line with previous evidence (e.g. Fama and French [1988]) 
that series are highly autocorrelated but slowly mean reverting processes. Johansen 
[1995] tests for cointegration demonstrate that dividend growth and capital gains are 
cointegrated.  
The distributional characteristics of the dividend growth and inflation data make 
it hard to draw definitive conclusions based on the full sample and post war period for 
France, Germany and Japan. Distortions from the period around the First World War and 
Second World War are substantial. French equity markets were closed and the French 
economy suffered from tremendous bouts of inflation coming out of the wars. The 
average yearly inflation rate for the full sample is 8.5%, substantially higher than the 
average bond yield for the sample, indicating a negative expected return. The expected 
equity returns for Germany over the full period starting 1924 are simply too high to be 
credible. This is due to the fact that the dividend growth series in the Nazi era and the 
post-war period contains a lot of positive outliers skewing the average value. Substantia l 
negative returns are observed in the Japanese bond market during the 1940s, where the 
actual real returns over the decade were –20% annualised. This is a function of a rise in 
nominal yields from 3.7% to 5.5% over the period 1946 – 1948 and substantial post war 
inflation. High dividend growth data in Japan for the post war period resemble the 
German data and are equally suspicious. Expected returns for full sample period and post 
war period are not reported. 4  
                                                 
4 As the outliers influence the results we have also calculated expected returns using median 
values instead of simple averages. These are left unreported, but are available at request. Though 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Having demonstrated how the workhorse of asset pricing, the Gordon growth model, 
generates expected return for equities, we are now in a position to compare the expected 
return and the actual return. Table 3 gives the expected returns on equity and bond per 
country. As a consequence of the discussed data issues, we report returns for the 1961 – 
2000 period for all countries, reflecting three considerations. First, times of financial 
distress, in which the collapse of a nation’s economy, hyperinflation, war, or, revolution 
threatens the capital base and distorts the average returns. Objectively measuring the ERP 
in such conditions might be difficult. Second, the hyperinflation in some of the war torn 
countries did not subside until the early 1950s. During the 1950s, financial markets 
resumed normalcy, and financial data started to reflect free market movement rather than 
state control. Third, though Germany issued the first post-war bonds in 1948, it was only 
after the creation of the Bundesbank in 1957 that government bonds regained the safe-
haven status. As the main focus of this paper is to contrast the returns in the US with 
those of other markets, we start with a detailed description of the US results. Results for 
other markets follow this discussion. 
                                                                                                                                     
median values provide a telling picture of the distributional characteristics, we doubt whether such 
an unconditional expected return generated is unbiased and hence should not be taken as the 
central estimate. 
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Table 3: Expected equity, bond returns and ERP in international context. In this table we compare expected and actual 
returns on equity and bonds for the five largest economies (France, Germany, Japan, UK and US). Following Fama and 
French [2002], the expected return is the sum of the average dividend yield and average annual growth rate for the period, 
assuming no change in yields. Expected real bond returns are constructed by subtracting actual annual inflation from 
nominal bond yields, assuming no change in yields. The difference between the two series, ERP and actual excess returns, 
are in the final columns.  
Time period Equity  Bond  ERP  
France Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual 
1961 – 2000 7.13% 6.54% 3.04% 2.93% 4.09% 3.61% 
Germany       
1961 – 2000 6.11% 5.22% 3.95% 4.36% 2.16% 0.86% 
Japan       
1961 – 2000 2.58% 3.96% 2.02% 3.94% 0.56% 0.02% 
UK       
1924 – 2000 6.59% 6.81% 1.60% 1.28% 4.49% 5.50% 
1946 – 2000 6.60% 7.17% 1.81% 1.06% 4.79% 6.11% 
1961 – 2000 5.61% 6.74% 2.29% 3.09% 3.32% 3.65% 
US       
1871 – 2000 5.96% 7.28% 2.35% 2.49% 3.61% 4.79% 
1871 – 1945 6.26% 6.84% 2.72% 3.46% 3.57% 3.39% 
1946 – 2000 5.55% 7.88% 1.87% 1.19% 3.67% 6.69% 
1961 – 2000 4.25% 7.10% 2.85% 2.40% 1.40% 4.70% 
 
Interestingly, the predictive power for US equity returns is reasonable for the pre-
war period, but breaks down for the post-war period. In line with Fama and French 
[2002], our results confirm that the expected return has more than twice the precision as 
of the actual returns. The (unreported) standard errors are much smaller. The discrepancy 
between expected and actual equity return is at its greatest over the past two decades. 
Why has the actual equity return diverged so much from their theoretical expected value? 
The difference between the unconditional expected return (average dividend yield and 
average dividend growth) and actual return (average dividend yield and average annual 
capital gain) is the gap between the average dividend growth and average capital gain. 
Average dividend yield for 1946 – 2000 was 3.8% and dividend growth for the 1946-
2000 period was 1.7%, generating 5.6% expected returns. The actual average return was 
7.9%. The dividend yield falls from 3.7% in Jan 1946 to 1.2% in Dec 2000. The growth 
in equity prices was 3.7/1.2=3.1 times what it would have been if dividend yield had 
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remained at the 1946 level. Roughly speaking, this adds about 2.1% per year to the 
compound return and explains the majority of the 2.3% unexpected return. Clearly the 
repricing of equity has resulted into some unexpected gains. 
Expected and actual US bond returns for the full period match adequately; only 
0.14% separates the two. It is interesting to note that in the period before the Second 
World War, expected returns were surpassed as bond returned more, whereas in post-war 
period investors expectations were not met and actual returns were 0.7% lower. As a 
cause of this divergence Arnott and Bernstein [2002] and Siegel [1998] point towards the 
decoupling of nominal from real bond yields. Until the last 40 years, there was virtually 
no trend in US inflation. However, in the post 1945 period, the rate of inflation hardly 
turned negative and consumer prices persistently trended higher. Expected inflation 
became a normal part of bond valuation, but bond investors misunderstood the effects of 
leaving the gold standard and the role of fiscal policy and subsequently underestimated 
inflation. 
For the full sample period we find an ERP of 3.6% for the US and numbers for 
both sub periods are broadly similar. Again the predictability is better for the pre-war 
period. As equity returned more and bonds less than expected in the post war period, the 
actual excess returns surpassed expectations. Fama and French [2002] use the similar 
dividend growth model based on Gordon [1962] for the period 1872-1999 and find an 
ERP of 3.8% for period up to 1949 and 3.4% for period after 1949. Our numbers are 
comparable taking into account the slight differences in sample period, methodology and 
data.  
For the UK we find that expected equity returns are higher than those in the US; a 
result of higher average dividend yield and higher average real dividend growth. Actual 
equity returns surpassed expectations for the full sample and for the post war period as 
dividend yields in the UK receded to lower levels. However, the magnitude of “surprise” 
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is less than in the US. As bonds also returned less than expected, the excess returns in the 
UK were higher than the ERP.  
  Several interesting observations can be drawn from the data for the sample 
period 1961 – 2000, the period arguably free from the impact of outliers and financial 
shocks. First, in France and Germany, actual equity returns are lower than expected. This 
is in contrast to Japan, UK and US where the actual returns surpass expectations. The 
magnitude of “surprise” is by far the largest in the US. Actual returns on bonds are lower 
than expected in both France and the US, though the difference for France is small. The 
returns on Japanese bonds were substantially above what could reasonably be expected. 
As a consequence the excess return only surpasses the ERP in the UK and US. 
 
5. LOOKING AHEAD 
Where does this leave us for expected equity returns in the US? Ignoring future changes 
in valuation, the expected real equity return in the US is low. At time of writing dividend 
yields are only 1.6%. Lacking a reliable estimate for growth in future dividends we apply 
its post war average of 1.7%. Adding the two generates an expected return on equity of 
3.3%. This is far shy of actual returns achieved in history. Expected real bond returns 
based on 10-year TIPS are approximately 2%, resulting in a meagre ERP of 1.3%. 5   
Though Fama and French [2002] argue that share buy backs only change the timing of 
dividend, one could be tempted to raise the dividend yields by 0.5% to compensate for 
that effect. Arguably, one might argue for higher dividends in the future (e.g. as the profit 
share of GDP rise), say another 1% annually. However, even after these more generous 
assumptions the equity risk premium is only 2.8%. A worrying omen for investors is that 
the subsequent returns on equities might even disappoint as the models assume that the 
current yield is fair. Actual returns are likely to be worse if we take into account that 
                                                 
5  We use TIPS as proxy for real bond yields, as they are readily available. The alternative of using 
nominal bond yields minus actual or expected CPI inflation would result in similar numbers. 
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valuations will mean revert and yields move up to their historic average. Even ignoring 
the valuation issue the real expected return on equity are low and offer only minor 
compensation over real bonds.  
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we used a dividend growth model to generate expected equity returns. We 
show that for the period 1871 – 2000, actual US equity returns were 1.3% above what 
could reasonably be expected. The majority of the difference arises in the post-war 
period. Similar models for bonds show that the expected return for US bonds match the 
actual returns for bonds. In the period before the war, expected returns were surpassed as 
bonds returned more, but in post war period investors expectations were not met and 
actual returns were 0.7% lower. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the excess 
return in the post war period was far higher than expected. Bond investors got less than 
expected, equity investors received more. A substantial part of the actual return is due to 
this revaluation of equity, not because of changes in the underlying fundamentals 
(dividends). One of the pitfalls of using historic excess returns is lacking this knowledge. 
An international comparison of expected bond and equity returns between the 
five largest economies shows that in a cross-sectional comparison, the excess return in the 
US is remarkable. Expected and actual returns in France, Germany and Japan are all 
substantially impacted in the period surrounding the World Wars. The UK is the only 
other country where excess returns are above what could reasonably be expected. This 
suggests that the US data suffer from survivorship bias and provides an additional 
argument not to rely on historical excess returns when projecting expected returns.  
Even based on generous assumptions, current lofty valuations do not bode well 
for investors. After a three-year bear market in equity, a reasonable investor should still 
not expect much return from US equities.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure A 1: Nominal and real total return index US equity market. This figure gives the total return index for the 
S&P500 for the US for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives 
nominal index, the right hand side the inflation adjusted real index. Both indices are indexed in 1871 and have similar 
scale. 
  
Source: Shiller [2000] and updated by author.   
Table A 1:Real annualised equity returns US. This table shows the real annualised equity return, standard deviation and 
standard error by decade for US equity market data. Data are for the S&P500 for sample period 1871 – 2000. 
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total equity return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total equity 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1871 – 1880 12.24% 10.46% 3.31% 
1881 – 1890 4.59% 10.10% 3.19% 
1891 – 1900 9.05% 11.62% 3.67% 
1901 – 1910 5.46% 12.97% 4.10% 
1911 – 1920 -4.09% 11.72% 3.71% 
1921 – 1930 16.54% 15.83% 5.01% 
1931 – 1940 3.21% 29.93% 9.46% 
1941 – 1950 6.51% 12.99% 4.11% 
1951 – 1960 14.24% 9.78% 3.09% 
1961 – 1970 5.03% 11.29% 3.57% 
1971 – 1980 0.33% 13.22% 4.18% 
1981 – 1990 9.04% 13.05% 4.13% 
1991 – 2000 14.50% 10.16% 3.21% 
1871 – 2000 7.28% 14.28% 1.25% 
1871 – 1945 6.84% 15.80% 1.82% 
1946 – 2000 7.80% 11.91% 1.61% 
1961 – 2000 7.10% 12.04% 1.90% 










































































Figure A 2: Nominal and real return index US bond market. This figure gives the index for an index of 10-year bonds 
in the US for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives nominal index, 
the right hand side the inflation adjusted real index. Both indices are indexed in 1871 and have similar scale. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data. 
Table A 2: Real annualised bond returns US. This table shows the real annualised bond return, standard deviation and 
standard error by decade for US bond market data. Data are for a 10-year bond for sample period 1871 – 2000.  
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total bond return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total bond 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1871 – 1880 9.54% 9.06% 2.87% 
1881 – 1890 5.50% 4.59% 1.45% 
1891 – 1900 4.06% 6.56% 2.07% 
1901 – 1910 0.59% 5.01% 1.59% 
1911 – 1920 -5.30% 5.68% 1.80% 
1921 – 1930 8.10% 3.66% 1.16% 
1931 – 1940 5.62% 4.70% 1.49% 
1941 – 1950 -3.99% 3.73% 1.18% 
1951 – 1960 -0.28% 4.26% 1.35% 
1961 – 1970 -0.56% 7.09% 2.24% 
1971 – 1980 -5.26% 11.83% 3.74% 
1981 – 1990 9.55% 16.14% 5.10% 
1991 – 2000 6.53% 8.64% 2.73% 
1871 – 2000 2.49% 7.94% 0.70% 
1871 – 1945 3.46% 5.83% 0.67% 
1946 – 2000 1.19% 10.13% 1.37% 
1961 – 2000 2.40% 11.55% 1.83% 




































































Figure A 3: Nominal and real total return index French equity market. This figure gives the total return index for the 
SBF250 in France for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives nominal 
index, the right hand side the inflation adjusted real index. Both indices are indexed in 1898 and have similar scale. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 3: Real annualised equity returns France. This table shows the real annualised equity return, standard deviation 
and standard error by decade for French equity market data. Data are for the SBF250 for sample period 1901 – 2000. 
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total equity return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total equity 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1901 – 1910 6.37% 6.39% 2.02% 
1911 – 1920 -9.85% 16.80% 5.31% 
1921 – 1930 9.88% 17.73% 5.61% 
1931 – 1940 2.30% 23.29% 7.36% 
1941 – 1950 -13.79% 24.47% 7.74% 
1951 – 1960 19.58% 14.96% 4.73% 
1961 – 1970 -0.62% 13.25% 4.19% 
1971 – 1980 -0.36% 19.30% 6.10% 
1981 – 1990 12.74% 22.15% 7.00% 
1991 – 2000 15.38% 17.10% 5.41% 
1901 – 2000 3.65% 18.41% 1.84% 
1901 – 1945 0.54% 18.48% 2.75% 
1946 – 2000 6.27% 18.33% 2.47% 
1961 – 2000 6.54% 18.30% 2.89% 









































































Figure A 4: Nominal and real total return i ndex French bond market. This figure gives the index for an index of 10-
year bonds in France for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives 
nominal index, the right hand side the inflation adjusted real index. Both indices are indexed in 1898. The scales are 
different. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 4: Real annualised bond returns France. This table shows the real annualised bond return, standard deviation 
and standard error by decade for French bond market data. Data are for a 10-year bond for sample period 1901 – 2000.  
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total bond return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total bond 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1901 – 1910 2.59% 1.07% 0.34% 
1911 – 1920 -12.06% 14.19% 4.49% 
1921 – 1930 2.29% 11.35% 3.59% 
1931 – 1940 0.12% 9.20% 2.91% 
1941 – 1950 -22.40% 13.06% 4.13% 
1951 – 1960 0.49% 7.83% 2.48% 
1961 – 1970 -0.99% 4.37% 1.38% 
1971 – 1980 -5.61% 8.22% 2.60% 
1981 – 1990 9.45% 12.30% 3.89% 
1991 – 2000 9.74% 8.02% 2.54% 
1871 – 2000 -2.10% 10.10% 1.01% 
1901 – 1945 -4.12% 10.35% 1.54% 
1946 – 2000 -0.42% 9.88% 1.33% 
1961 – 2000 2.93% 8.88% 1.40% 





































































Figure A 5: Nominal and real total return index German equity market. This figure gives the total return index for the 
CDAX in Germany for the sample period 1914 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives 
nominal index, the right hand side the inflation adjusted real index. Both indices are indexed in 1871, but have different 
scales. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 5: Real annualised equity returns Germany. This table shows the real annualised equity return, standard 
deviation and standard error by decade for German equity market data. Data are for the CDAX for sample period 1924 – 
2000. 
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total equity return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total equity 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1924 – 1930 -5.27% 34.52% 13.05% 
1931 – 1940 13.60% 12.82% 4.05% 
1941 – 1950 -7.73% 30.16% 9.54% 
1951 – 1960 27.89% 16.08% 5.08% 
1961 – 1970 -2.44% 13.09% 4.14% 
1971 – 1980 0.61% 13.63% 4.31% 
1981 – 1990 12.37% 19.83% 6.27% 
1991 – 2000 11.15% 17.04% 5.39% 
1924 – 2000 6.14% 29.74% 2.61% 
1924 – 1945 -25.10% 35.25% 4.07% 
1946 – 2000 6.70% 20.13% 2.71% 
1961 – 2000 5.22% 16.19% 2.56% 












































































Figure A 6: Nominal and real total return index German bond market. This figure gives the index for an index of 10-
year bonds in Germany for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives 
nominal index, the right hand side the inflation adjusted real index. Both indices are indexed in 1924 and have similar 
scales. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 6: Real annualised bond returns Germany. This table shows the real annualised bond return, standard deviation 
and standard error by decade for German bond market data. Data are for a 10-year bond for sample period 1924 – 2000.  
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total bond return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total bond 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1924 – 1930 5.71% 13.04% 4.93% 
1931 – 1940 7.65% 11.03% 3.49% 
1941 – 1950 0.73% 5.84% 1.85% 
1951 – 1960 2.62% 4.75% 1.50% 
1961 – 1970 2.60% 3.68% 1.16% 
1971 – 1980 2.50% 6.80% 2.15% 
1981 – 1990 5.24% 6.93% 2.19% 
1991 – 2000 7.18% 5.65% 1.79% 
1924 – 2000 4.27% 7.53% 0.86% 
1924 – 1945 6.05% 10.56% 2.25% 
1946 – 2000 3.57% 5.90% 0.80% 
1961 – 2000 4.36% 5.92% 0.94% 





































































Figure A 7: Nominal and real total return index Japanese equity market. This figure gives the total return index for 
the TPX in Japan for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives nominal 
index, the right hand side the inflat ion adjusted real index. Both indices are indexed in 1914 and have similar scale. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 7: Real annualised equity returns Japan. This table shows the real annualised equity return, standard deviation 
and standard error by decade for German equity market data. Data are for the Topix for sample period 1926 – 2000. 
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total equity return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total equity 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1926 – 1930 5.12% 13.07% 4.13% 
1931 – 1940 7.54% 15.43% 4.88% 
1941 – 1950 -6.32% 41.34% 13.07% 
1951 – 1960 33.79% 21.68% 6.86% 
1961 – 1970 1.39% 16.75% 5.30% 
1971 – 1980 5.68% 15.15% 4.79% 
1981 – 1990 12.11% 19.44% 6.15% 
1991 – 2000 -2.78% 19.68% 6.22% 
1926 – 2000 6.61% 22.14% 2.65% 
1926 – 1945 3.78% 13.48% 3.01% 
1946 – 2000 7.66% 24.52% 3.31% 
1961 – 2000 3.96% 17.87% 2.83% 









































































Figure A 8: Nominal and real total return index Japanese bond market. This figure gives the index for an index of 10-
year bonds in Japan for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives 
nominal index and is indexed in 1871. The right hand side gives the inflation adjusted real index, which is indexed in 1900. 
The scales are different. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 8: Real annualised bond returns Japan. This table shows the real annualised bond return, standard deviation 
and standard error by decade for German bond market data. Data are for a 10-year bond for sample period 1926 – 2000.  
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total bond return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total bond 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1926 – 1930 16.21% 6.39% 2.86% 
1931 – 1940 1.13% 9.24% 2.92% 
1941 – 1950 -34.42% 25.99% 8.22% 
1951 – 1960 0.86% 15.14% 4.79% 
1961 – 1970 4.92% 9.65% 3.05% 
1971 – 1980 -1.81% 7.69% 2.43% 
1981 – 1990 6.19% 9.63% 3.04% 
1991 – 2000 6.69% 6.99% 2.21% 
1926 – 2000 -2.27% 13.80% 1.59% 
1926 – 1945 -0.73% 13.46% 3.01% 
1946 – 2000 -2.83% 13.93% 1.88% 
1961 – 2000 3.94% 8.60% 1.36% 






































































Figure A 9: Nominal and real total return index UK equity market. This figure gives the total return index for the 
FTSE in the UK for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives nominal 
index and is indexed in 1871. The right hand side the inflation adjusted real index, indexed in 1906. Both indices have 
similar scale. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 9: Real annualised equity returns UK.  This table shows the real annualised equity return, standard deviation and 
standard error by decade for UK equity market data. Data are for the FTSE for sample period 1906 – 2000. 
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total equity return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total equity 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1906 – 1910 -2.06% 6.80% 3.04% 
1911 – 1920 -12.51% 8.38% 2.65% 
1921 – 1930 10.61% 8.93% 2.83% 
1931 – 1940 0.44% 17.34% 5.48% 
1941 – 1950 8.99% 10.95% 3.46% 
1951 – 1960 11.45% 14.37% 4.54% 
1961 – 1970 3.55% 14.18% 4.49% 
1971 – 1980 0.14% 28.29% 8.95% 
1981 – 1990 11.70% 19.38% 6.13% 
1991 – 2000 12.06% 14.23% 4.50% 
1906 – 2000 6.79% 17.73% 2.12% 
1906 – 1945 5.39% 15.17% 3.92% 
1946 – 2000 7.17% 18.38% 2.48% 
1961 – 2000 6.74% 19.85% 3.14% 









































































Figure A 10: Nominal and real total return index UK bond market. This figure gives the index for an index of 10-year 
bonds in the UK for the sample period 1871 – 2002. The axes are in logarithmic terms. The left hand graph gives nominal 
index and is indexed in 1871. The right hand side gives the inflation adjusted real index, which is indexed in 1906. The 
scales are similar. 
  
Source: Global Financial Data.   
Table A 10: Real annualised bond return s UK.   This table shows the real annualised bond return, standard deviation and 
standard error by decade for UK bond market data. Data are for a 10-year bond for sample period 1901 – 2000.  
Legend: m  is the average annualised real total bond return, s is the standard deviation of annualised real total bond 
returns and 
T
s  is the standard error of the average returns.  
Time period m  s  
T
s  
1906 – 1910 -1.03% 5.88% 2.63% 
1911 – 1920 -11.32% 8.43% 2.66% 
1921 – 1930 13.50% 10.67% 3.37% 
1931 – 1940 3.87% 12.46% 3.94% 
1941 – 1950 0.57% 7.26% 2.30% 
1951 – 1960 -3.97% 7.94% 2.51% 
1961 – 1970 -2.67% 8.24% 2.61% 
1971 – 1980 -2.99% 12.46% 3.94% 
1981 – 1990 5.62% 11.65% 3.68% 
1991 – 2000 13.25% 11.61% 3.67% 
1906 – 2000 1.28% 10.29% 1.06% 
1906 – 1945 1.59% 9.94% 1.57% 
1946 – 2000 1.06% 10.54% 1.42% 
1961 – 2000 3.09% 11.23% 1.78% 




































































Figure A 11: International dividend yields. This figure gives the dividend yields for France, Germany, Japan and the UK 






























































































































































































Table A 11: Sample statistics. This table presents the sample statistics for dividend yield (D/P), consumer price inflation 
(CPI), dividend growth rates )( dg and nominal bond yield (BY). Consumer price inflation and dividend growth rates are 
changes in month-on-month terms. Full sample periods are reported in parenthesis. We report number of monthly 
observation s, mean values, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, median, minimum and maximum values.  
 D/P CPI 
dg  BY 
France (1901 – 2000) 1135 1200 1133 1200 
Mean 3.72% 0.67% 0.14% 5.96% 
St. Dev. 1.55% 2.33% 5.02% 2.96% 
Skewness 0.59 4.05 3.04 1.52 
Kurtosis 0.90 34.20 41.65 2.10 
Median 3.71% 0.28% 0.00% 5.17% 
Min 0.69% -8.86% -26.67% 2.88% 
Max 9.42% 26.78% 71.38% 17.32% 
Germany (1924 – 2000) 851 923 848 923 
Mean 3.66% 0.20% 1.23% 6.20% 
St. Dev. 1.35% 0.78% 15.39% 1.98% 
Skewness 0.59 0.73 15.29 -0.59 
Kurtosis 1.84 14.19 306.75 2.14 
Median 3.59% 0.18% 0.20% 6.16% 
Min 0.10% -4.77% -68.53% 0.00% 
Max 9.37% 6.59% 338.87% 13.12% 
Japan (1926 – 2000) 849 900 848 877 
Mean 3.98% 0.79% 0.15% 6.04% 
St. Dev. 2.83% 4.18% 4.83% 2.43% 
Skewness 0.60 14.56 0.27 0.36 
Kurtosis -0.10 288.30 5.48 0.04 
Median 3.97% 0.27% -0.16% 5.59% 
Min 0.33% -5.41% -30.36% 0.77% 
Max 14.12% 93.64% 23.89% 14.82% 
UK (1924 – 2000) 924 924 923 924 
Mean 4.78% 0.36% 0.15% 6.60% 
St. Dev. 1.13% 1.26% 4.10% 3.33% 
Skewness 0.79 0.32 0.00 0.78 
Kurtosis 3.63 1.51 7.57 -0.38 
Median 4.69% 0.24% 0.17% 5.36% 
Min 2.06% -3.51% -27.10% 2.53% 
Max 12.04% 8.27% 29.06% 17.10% 
US (1871 – 2000) 1560 1559 1559 1560 
Mean 4.68% 0.18% 0.11% 4.60% 
St. Dev. 1.54% 1.10% 1.49% 2.42% 
Skewness 0.66 0.00 -0.38 1.65 
Kurtosis 1.78 5.93 4.20 2.80 
Median 4.54% 0.12% 0.12% 3.62% 
Min 1.09% -6.58% -8.93% 1.55% 
Max 13.84% 7.04% 8.01% 15.64% 
 
